Syracuse University

SURFACE
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Technical Reports

College of Engineering and Computer Science

2-3-2012

Identifying and analyzing pointer misuses for sophisticated
memory-corruption exploit diagnosis
Mingwei Zhang
University of Singapore

Aravind Prakash
Syracuse University

Xiaolei Li
National University of Singapore

Zhenkai Liang
National University of Singapore

Heng Yin
Syracuse University, heyin@syr.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/eecs_techreports
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Zhang, Mingwei; Prakash, Aravind; Li, Xiaolei; Liang, Zhenkai; and Yin, Heng, "Identifying and analyzing
pointer misuses for sophisticated memory-corruption exploit diagnosis" (2012). Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science - Technical Reports. 26.
https://surface.syr.edu/eecs_techreports/26

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Engineering and Computer Science at
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science - Technical Reports by
an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

SYR-EECS-2012-01

February 3, 2012

Identifying and Analyzing Pointer Misuses for Sophisticated Memory-corruption
Exploit Diagnosis
Mingwei Zhang
Aravind Prakash
Xiaolei Li
Zhenkai Liang
Heng Yin

School of Computing, National University of Singapore

arprakas@syr.edu, Syracuse University
School of Computing, National University of Singapore
School of Computing, National University of Singapore

heyin@syr.edu, Syracuse University

ABSTRACT: Software exploits are one of the major threats to the Internet security. A large family of exploits works by

corrupting memory of the victim process to execute malicious code. To quickly respond to these attacks, it is critical to
automatically diagnose such exploits to find out how they circumvent existing defense mechanisms.

Because of the

complexity of the victim programs and sophistication of recent exploits, existing analysis techniques fall short: they either
miss important attack steps or report too much irrelevant information. In this paper, based on the observation that the key
steps in memory corruption exploits often involve pointer misuses, we propose a novel solution, PointerScope, to use type
inference on binary execution to detect the pointer misuses induced by an exploit. These pointer misuses highlight the
important attack steps of the exploit, and therefore convey valuable information about the exploit mechanisms.

Our

approach complements dependency-based solutions to perform more comprehensive diagnosis of sophisticated memory
exploits.

We prototyped PointerScope and evaluated it using real-world exploit samples and demonstrated that

PointerScope can successfully capture the key attack steps, which significantly facilitates attack response.
KEYWORDS:

Memory Forensics, Type Propagation, Pointer violation, Pointerscope, Memory exploit
Syracuse University - Department of EECS,
4-206 CST, Syracuse, NY 13244
(P) 315.443.2652 (F) 315.443.2583
http://eecs.syr.edu

Identifying and Analyzing Pointer Misuses for Sophisticated Memory-corruption
Exploit Diagnosis
Mingwei Zhang1 , Aravind Prakash2 , Xiaolei Li1 , Zhenkai Liang1 , and Heng Yin2
1
School of Computing, National University of Singapore
2
Department of Computer Science, Syracuse University

Abstract
Software exploits are one of the major threats to the Internet security. A large family of exploits works by corrupting memory of the victim process to execute malicious code.
To quickly respond to these attacks, it is critical to automatically diagnose such exploits to find out how they circumvent
existing defense mechanisms. Because of the complexity of
the victim programs and sophistication of recent exploits,
existing analysis techniques fall short: they either miss important attack steps or report too much irrelevant information. In this paper, based on the observation that the key
steps in memory corruption exploits often involve pointer
misuses, we propose a novel solution, PointerScope, to use
type inference on binary execution to detect the pointer misuses induced by an exploit. These pointer misuses highlight the important attack steps of the exploit, and therefore convey valuable information about the exploit mechanisms. Our approach complements dependency-based solutions to perform more comprehensive diagnosis of sophisticated memory exploits. We prototyped PointerScope and
evaluated it using real-world exploit samples and demonstrated that PointerScope can successfully capture the key
attack steps, which significantly facilitates attack response.

1

Introduction

Software exploits are one of the major threats to the Internet security. A large family of exploits works by corrupting memory of the victim process to execute malicious
code. To quickly respond to such attacks, defenders critically need techniques that can automatically diagnose an
exploit and understand the inner-working of an exploit.
The main difficulty in diagnosing memory-corruption
exploits is caused by the constantly-evolving attack techniques. Memory-corruption exploits have existed for
decades, but recent attack techniques are getting more and
more sophisticated. For example, due to the wide adoption of memory-corruption prevention mechanisms, such as

address-space-layout randomization (ASLR) [3, 9], attackers are no longer able to directly execute malicious code
they have injected. They need to resort to additional techniques to bypass the defense mechanisms and locate their
malicious code. As a result, recent memory-corruption attacks often consist of a sequence of key steps. A major challenge to attack diagnosis is to get the complete picture of
the attack, including all steps from the initial vulnerability
exploit to the malicious code execution.
Existing techniques of attack diagnosis mainly focus
on a single step of the attacks. For example, some techniques [22, 37] perform analysis on a memory snapshot at
the moment when the attack is detected. The effectiveness
of such memory analysis is limited by available information in the snapshot, because the evidence of previous attack
steps may have already been destroyed before the attack is
detected.
It has been observed that traditional memory exploits often involve misuse of pointers [13]. By analyzing several recent memory-corruption exploits, we found that this observation can be extended to most of the key steps in a sophisticated attack, which misuses other types of data as pointers, especially pointers that control program execution, such
as return addresses and virtual function pointers. Based
on this observation, we propose a novel technique, called
PointerScope, for automated exploit diagnosis by detecting
and analyzing pointer misuses. That is, from the execution
of a binary executable, we automatically infer the type of
each of registers and memory locations. As pointer misuse
is one of the most important characteristics of key attack
steps, our approach detects misuses as type conflicts when
other types of data are used as pointers, especially control
pointers. Then we identify the instructions and operands involved in the type conflict, and understand how an exploit
happens and how it circumvents existing defense mechanisms.
To evaluate the efficacy of our approach, we have implemented a prototype system of PointerScope and evaluated it
using real-world memory-corruption exploits. The experiments demonstrate that PointerScope detected pointer mis-
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Figure 1. Stack layout in an SEH exploit.
uses as the key attack steps and highlighted a small number
of instructions from a trace of multi-million instructions.
In summary, we have made the following main contributions:
• We propose to identify and analyze pointer misuses
as a generic approach for diagnosing sophisticated
memory-corruption exploits. Our approach complements existing dependency-based solutions, and diagnoses the exploits to reveal details of the attacks’ key
steps.
• We define a small type system on x86 architecture and
devise a type inference algorithm to resolve type information during the binary execution. Pointer misuses
can then be detected as type conflicts.
• We implement a prototype system of PointerScope
and evaluate it using seven real-world exploit samples,
demonstrating the capability and effectiveness of this
tool.

Paper Organization The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses an example of sophisticated memory-error exploits to motivate our solution. Section 3 details the design of PointerScope. Section 4 describes our prototype implementation challenges and Section 5 discusses the experimental results. Section 6 presents
the limitations of the current system and future work. We
discuss related work in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the
paper.

2

Background

In this section, we describe a motivating example of sophisticated memory-error exploits and discuss the need for
new solutions for diagnosing the key steps of such exploits.
A Motivating example. Structured Exception Handling
(SEH) [27] is a mechanism for handling program exceptions on Windows. Under this mechanism, a thread registers the handlers for its exceptions, and Windows maintains
the registered exception handlers of a thread in a list of exception registration records in the thread’s Thread Information Block, which is located at the bottom of the stack. Each
record has a function pointer field, pointing to the exception
handler function. Windows requires that exception handlers
have the following function signature:
__cdecl _except_handler(
struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD *ExceptionRecord,
void * EstablisherFrame,
struct _CONTEXT *ContextRecord,
void * DispatcherContext
);

When an exception occurs, Windows locates the exception registration record, prepares all the parameters on top
of the stack, and invokes the exception handler. Among the
parameters to the exception handler, the second parameter,
EstablisherFrame, is the address of the current exception registration record.
The SEH mechanism has been abused by attackers as
a key step to circumvent stack protections [26]. Because
of the deployment of defense mechanisms against memoryerror exploits, such as address-space layout randomization,

attackers cannot easily locate the malicious code they inject into the victim process. In this attack, the SEH mechanism is leveraged to allow attackers to reliably locate the
injected code. We illustrate the attack in Figure 1. First, the
attack overflows an unbounded buffer to corrupt the stack
all the way to the bottom of the stack, overwriting both
the return address and the exception registration records.
The overwritten return address is set to an invalid address
(e.g., 0xffffffff), which triggers an exception when the corresponding function returns, illustrated on the left-hand part
of Figure 1. In response to this exception, the Windows
SEH mechanism prepares the parameters to the exception
handler and stores them on top of the stack, illustrated on
the right-hand part of Figure 1. Note that the second parameter (EstablisherFrame at the address 0x0013c43c)
points to the current exception registration record, which
is at the address 0x0013de14. To take advantage of this
pointer, the attacker overwrites the function pointer (at the
address 0x0013de18) to the exception handler with an address pointing to an instruction sequence in memory: pop
%esi; pop %ecx; ret (we call this sequence as a PPR
slice in short). In this example, this variable value is
0x71ab8e4a, which points to a PPR slice in the library
ws2 32.dll. When the call to the exception handler executes this PPR slice, the two items on the stack top, the return address and ExceptionRecord, are popped out, and
the EstablisherFrame parameter is used as the return address, leading the control flow to the address 0x0013de14,
which is the start of the exception registration record. The
attacker has prepared a short jump instruction (jmp $8,
represented as binary 0xeb06), which redirects the control
follow to the shellcode placed at the address 0x0013de1c.
Note that in this attack, the attacker does not need to locate the injected shellcode. It is done by exploiting the SEH
mechanism.
This attack example has the following key steps: 1) an
exception is triggered by returning to an invalid memory
address; 2) a corrupted exception routine is invoked in response; 3) a PPR slice is executed, which transfers control
to injected code on the stack; and 4) the injected code is
executed.
Challenges to taint-based analysis. This attacks illustrated some of the difficulties faced by taint-based approaches in attack diagnosis. Using taint analysis, we
can observe that the overwritten return address at address
0x0013c7e0 is tainted by external inputs. However, the control transfer in the third step does not get its target address
from attackers. Instead, it is the SEH handling mechanism
that pushes the target address onto the stack, so the address
is not affected by external inputs from attackers. Therefore,
taint analysis techniques cannot effectively identify the third
key step in the above example, although they have no problem in identifying the initial exploit (the first step), as well

as the execution of injected code (the fourth step). Understanding the complete picture of this attack is important in
identifying the weakness of the exception handling mechanism, leading to solutions that can prevent the class of attacks. For example, Windows updates its exception handling mechanism to SafeSEH to prevent this type of attacks.
In general, dependency analysis, such as taint analysis [25] and backward slicing [5], has demonstrated its
power and effectiveness in memory exploit detection and diagnosis. However, to identify the key steps of an exploit and
reason about the causal relationships among them, we need
to take into account all kinds of dependency relationships,
including direct data dependency, indirect data dependency,
and control dependency: Direct data dependency considers
data movement from a location to another; Indirect data dependency incorporates the dependency between a memory
address and the memory content pointed to by this index;
Control dependency, on the other hand, models the dependency between a control decision and a data variable that is
set based on this control decision. However, conservatively
considering all these dependencies would extract enormous
amount of dependencies, most of which are actually irrelevant to the exploit. Therefore, in reality, all the existing
binary analysis techniques only consider a subset of these
dependencies. For example, taint analysis mainly considers direct data dependency, and may selectively enable indirect data dependency using heuristic policies. A recent
technique [17] expands this type of approaches by tracking
a subset of control dependency. In consequence, important
key steps and causal relationships may be unfortunately excluded from the diagnosis report.
Our observation. Exploits to computer systems involve
using program features in an unintended way. For example, in memory-error exploits, attacks often rely on pointer
misuses. Considering the above example, in the first key
step, an exception is triggered by using an invalid address
as return address (control pointer). In the second key step,
the process uses an overflowed function pointer to the exception handler. In the third step, the last instruction of
the PPR slice, ret, takes the value at the stack as the return address, which is the second parameter to the exception handler. This argument has been pushed onto stack as
an EstablisherFrame pointer, pointing to the current exception registration record.
Pointer misuse, a crucial characteristic in these key steps
for a successful attack, is the result of the flexibility of the
x86 instruction set. However, the programs produced by
compilers use the instructions in a rather consistent way.
In particular, the pointer values, especially control pointers,
are rarely derived from data of other types. Following this
observation, we aim to detect and analyze pointer misuses
by summarizing the common usage of instructions and detect misuses of pointers.
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Figure 2. Overview of PointerScope. Core components of PointerScope are illustrated in dark nodes.

3

Design of PointerScope

Given an exploit and its corresponding vulnerable program, the primary goal of PointerScope is to highlight the
exploit’s key steps in the huge amount of instructions and
help security analysts to understand the overall attack mechanisms.

3.1

Approach overview

Figure 2 depicts the overview of our approach, where the
core components of PointerScope are shown in dark color.
The execution monitor dynamically runs the vulnerable program with the given exploit, and collects a detailed execution trace. It also collects available auxiliary information,
such as the memory locations of loaded modules and symbols file (e.g., pdb files for Windows DLLs), to facilitate
further analysis. The diagnosis engine processes the execution trace and auxiliary information, and uses the data type
scope to infer data types of registers and memory locations
during the execution of the vulnerable program. The data
type scope detects pointer misuses as type conflicts. Based
on the result of the data type scope, the diagnosis engine
generates the diagnosis report by extracting the causal dependency relationships between the conflicts.
The main challenge faced by PointerScope is to infer
data types from instructions, and to define the consistency
rules among such types. Note that unlike recent solutions
in type inference on binaries [21, 23], the purpose of PointerScope is not to reveal the rich program information available in high-level languages. Instead, it aims to facilitate
exploit diagnosis by detecting type conflicts on instructions.

3.2

Detecting pointer misuse

In order to detect pointer misuses, we need to get the type
information of instruction operands to distinguish pointers
and other data. For this purpose, we define the data types
and the set of constraint rules for x86 instructions. We focus
on the 32-bit x86 instruction set in this paper.

Type
INT
CTR
DTR
OTR
PTR
ANY
NTR
CFL

Description
Integer
Control pointer
Data pointer
Types other than integer and pointer
pointer, supertype of CTR and DTR
can be any type
Non-pointer
conflict

Table 1. Types defined in PointerScope.
Type definitions Table 1 lists the types defined in PointerScope. The top portion of Table 1 lists the primitive types:
INT for integers, CTR for control pointers, DTR for data
pointers, and OTR for other types. Integers include index,
offset, counter and so on; Control pointers are memory addresses for code; Data pointers are memory addresses for
data; Others are for all other types of variable, which we do
not need to distinguish for the application of pointer misuse detection. The bottom portion of Table 1 lists aggregate
types, which are combined from primitive types. Aggregate
types are used to group types that can be treated similarly
into a super-type, so that the type system in PointerScope
will not be unnecessarily complex.
Because the objective of PointerScope is to help exploit
diagnosis, we keep the type system as simple as possible
to avoid overwhelming conflicts that may confuse security
analysts.
Instruction type constraints The type constraints posed
by instructions on their operands can be classified into two
categories. First, some instructions generate constraints
to the types of its operands. For example, multiplications
(mul/imul) and divisions (div/idiv) operate on integers.
Therefore, if any of these instructions is executed, we can
infer that the operands must be INT. Second, certain instructions (e.g., data transfer instructions mov, push, and pop)
propagate type from the source operand to the destination
operand.
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Figure 3. Relationship among types.
We studied the x86 instruction set and defined the type
constraints of common instructions. We summarize the constraints that common general purpose x86 instructions put
on their operands in Table 4 of the Appendix.
Note that the task of deciding an instruction’s type constraint is complicated by a few factors. First, an instruction’s behavior may depend on the value of its operands.
For example, the cmove instruction conditionally moves
data from its source operand to its destination operand. Second, some instructions have implicit operands. For example, the call instruction creates a return address on the
stack, which is also a control pointer.
When an instruction takes two typed operands as input,
we need to decide the type of the output operand. For typical scenarios, the result is straightforward, such as adding
two integers and adding a pointer and an integer. The main
challenge is caused by the special usage of instructions for
purposes such as performance optimization. We summarize
the common cases by analyzing common instruction patterns, and define the output type of an instruction for such
special cases. For example, bit operations and, xor, or are
commonly used in special ways: and %eax, %eax and or
%eax, 0 are used for zero test, while xor %eax, %eax is
used to set %eax to zero. We summarize them in Appendix.
As another example, lea $0x8(%eax, %ebx), %ecx is
not always for memory access. Instead, it is often used as
an efficient way to compute %eax+%ebx+$0x8 and store
the result in the register ecx. We discuss more about such
cases in Section 4.
External type constraints Type constraints from external
sources are also important. Many APIs and system calls are
documented, so type definitions in their argument lists can
be used to create type constraints.
char *strncpy(char *dst, const char *src,
size_t num);

For example, the above function prototype indicates that
the first two arguments are data pointers and the third argument is a 32-bit integer. If available, we may also use
type information in debugging symbols to create type constraints.
Another source of type information is the binary executable itself. Meta-data in the binary reveal operand type
information. Particularly, the relocation table lists the addresses of constant numbers that need to be updated during
relocation. These constant numbers are address references
either to a data variable or a function entry. So we resolve
them as PTR. On the contrary, the constant numbers that do
not appear in the relocation table are resolved as NTR. The
only exception is 0, which can be either a NULL pointer or a
zero value, and its address does not appear in the relocation
table. So it has to be ANY for its initial type.
Type inference and conflict detection The algorithm we
use for type inference is based on the classic type inference algorithm for a high-level programming language, Algorithm W [15]. We adapt this algorithm to suit our purpose
of exploit diagnosis.
First, in binary programs, we treat memory locations and
registers as variables. Unlike variables in a high-level programming language, variables in binary programs are frequently reused. Registers and local stack locations are often
used to store different types of data at different execution
stages. Therefore, for a destination operand, we cannot accumulate its constraints and detect type conflicts during the
binary execution. Instead, we always perform a strong update on the destination operand with the most precise type
at each execution moment. Type refinement and conflict
detection are only performed on source operands. In other
words, type refinement and conflict detection are performed
on variable reads, not on variable writes. This strategy is
also used to deal with union, where a field may have multiple types under different execution contexts.
Second, in the Algorithm W, all the type constraints of
variables are accumulated throughout the entire program,
and then the most precise type is resolved for each variable.
In our case, we need to resolve the most precise type for
each variable on the fly to detect type conflicts as early as
possible. Therefore, we need to take an eager approach in
identifying variable type. That is, whenever a more precise
type is resolved, this new type information will be immediately propagated to the other variables sharing the same
type, so that all of these variables have the most precise
type at this point of execution.
Based on the adapted algorithm, the data type scope
tracks the data type information of memory locations and
registers. It generates alerts when other type of data are
misused as pointers, or when data pointers are misused as
control pointers.

0x42050faf add %edx,0xﬀﬀfa90(%ebp)
Type Origin (NTR)
M@0xbﬀfebcc[4]

temporal

Type Usage (CTR)
0x080484b0 ret

Figure 4. The key-step graph of a simple format string exploit.

3.3

define the existing type of the variables. The labels of the
variable vertices indicate the variable’s type (M@ for memory and R@ for register), the variable’s unique identifier
(memory address or register name), as well as the variable’s
size measured in bytes (denoted as a number in the square
brackets after the variable’s unique identifier). The labels
of the instruction vertices indicate the instruction’s address,
disassembled instruction. It can also include the optional
operand information, as well as the function and library the
instruction belongs to.
In this example, the pointer misuse is generated on the
ret instruction at the instruction address 0x080484b0. It
uses variable at the address 0xbfffebcc as a control pointer
(return address), but the variable is inferred as an integer
from an add instruction at the address 0x42050faf. This
attack is a tradition attack without sophisticated attack steps,
so there is only a single key step in the attack.

Generating key-step graphs

After the data type scope identifies pointer misuses, the
diagnosis engine extracts the causal dependencies for these
conflicts to reveal the key steps of the given exploit. To
assist security analysts, we represent these dependency relationships using a graph. This key-step graph consists of a
set of vertices V and a set of edges E.
• Set of vertices V . A vertex is either an instruction or
a variable involved in a pointer misuse. Each conflict
will be represented in at least three vertices: a vertex
for the variable with a pointer misuse, a vertex for the
instruction that defines the original type of this variable, and a vertex for the instruction that causes type
conflicts.
• Set of edges E. An edge represents the relationship
among vertices. We use edges to record type relationship. There are three kinds of edges. “Type Origin”
edge is from the instruction that defines or resolves
the current type of a variable to the variable vertex
that has a conflict type. “Type Usage” edge originates
from the variable with pointer misuse to the instruction
that causes the pointer misuse when using this variable. ”Temporal Order” edge manifests the temporal
relations between the instruction vertices.
Figure 4 shows the key-step graph for the following simple format string exploit, where an integer counter in the
printf instruction is used to overwrite the return address.
printf("%p%p%p%n");

To better illustrate the attack, we use different shapes to
represent different types of vertices. The ellipse vertices are
variables involved in the pointer misuses; the shaded rectangles with round corner are the instructions where pointer
misuses are detected; the rectangles are the instructions that

Usage of the key-step graph. Note that this key-step
graph illustrates the big picture of an exploit, but it does
not convey the complete knowledge of the exploit. One usage of the key-step graph is to show the similarity among
attacks. For example, all attack techniques based on the
SEH mechanism will have similar key-step graph. Alternatively, the diagnosis result by PointerScope can be further
enhanced by dependency-based diagnosis. For example, using the standard slicing approach [5], we can extract instructions related to one attack step for investigators to investigate, including all the instructions that create and propagate
the misused variables.

4

Implementation

In this section, we describe the implementation of PointerScope in general, and discuss a few challenges we faced
in implementation.

4.1

Implementation details

We prototyped PointerScope on the Linux system. The
execution monitor component is based on the TEMU [35,
39] component of BitBlaze [1, 34], which extends the
QEMU [8, 29] whole system emulator to generate instruction traces for specified programs. Basing PointerScope
on TEMU has three advantages for vulnerability diagnosis. First, PointerScope can be easily extended to support a
new guest OS. Currently, it supports Windows 2000, Windows XP, and multiple Linux versions. Second, this emulation environment makes it easy to set up different configurations and software packages to test exploits. Third, it also
provides a good isolation between the exploit testing environment within virtual machine and the analysis environment on the host. Hence, even though the exploit may have

compromised the testing environment, the host machine remains intact. For each instruction executed by the program,
our execution monitor records the raw instruction and the
content of all its operands, including the implicit operands.
The data type scope and diagnosis engine are implemented
as standalone utilities, in about 3.6K line of C code.

4.2

Challenges in inferring types

Information from instruction addressing. The first
challenge is caused by instruction addressing. The x86
instruction set supports various addressing modes. Each
addressing mode has its typical pattern, which reveals information about the typical type of instruction operands.
However, the operands may be used differently by the compiler. In particular, the x86 instruction set supports the addressing mode base-index with displacement, where a memory address is composed in the format of base + index
+ displacement. For example, the instruction movl
$0x8(%eax, %ebx), %ecx stores the memory content of
%eax + %ebx + $0x8 into the register ecx. Typically,
the first register eax is the base, which is a pointer; The
second register ebx is the index, which is an integer. However, the compiler may exchange the base register with the
index register or even with the displacement, for example, $0x8(%ebx, %eax), as both instructions produce the
same result. We need to decide which register represents
the base.
We observed that, in most cases, the resulting memory
address is close to the value in the base register. Therefore,
we use the value of the registers as a hint and treat the register whose value is closest to the memory operand’s address
as the base register, which is a pointer.
Special usage of lea. Another challenge is from the special usage of instructions. A typical example is lea. It
is designed to load effective addresses, but it is often used
as an optimized way to carry out numerical calculation.
For example, lea $0x8(%eax, %ebx), %ecx computes
%eax+%ebx+$0x8 and puts the result into the register ecx.
So we should treat the lea instruction as a numerical calculation, without resolving the computation result as an address. Another example is the instructions shl and shr.
They are considered as multiplication and division operations in our implementation. These two instructions are
originally for bit operations, but they are widely used for
multiplication and division.
Equivalent instruction sequences. A third challenge is
from equivalent instruction sequences:
not
or
not

%ebp
$0x3,%ebp
%ebp

In the above real-world example, the instruction sequence produces the same result as a single instruction and
$0xfffffffc,%ebp, which is used to align a pointer by
clearing its lowest two bits. However, after applying the
not operation twice on ebp, which has a pointer type,
the type information is lost under our common type rules.
Looking at individual instructions separately will not catch
the instructions’ intention, and thus make wrong type assignments. Similarly, the sub and neg instructions can have
the similar effects on pointer as not.
In this implementation, we solve this problem by recognizing the common patterns and treat them as special cases.
Handling memory copy operations. Programs often
copy a memory region from one variable to another area in
a byte-by-byte fashion. In PointerScope, every write operation creates a new variable. So truncation and combination
will happen to the new copy of variables in the destination
region and the original type information is lost.
To solve this problem, we keep a dependency reference
for every byte inside a variable. For example, before using
a variable A, we will check the dependency of every byte in
A. If all bytes in A depend on another variable B, PointerScope assigns the type of B to A first. In this way, we can
recover variable information from memory copy operations.

5

Evaluation

We evaluated our approach using a few real-world exploits on both the Windows and the Linux platform. For
sample collection, we selected recent non-trivial memorycorruption attacks that have exploits available in the MetaSploit [24] framework. Not surprisingly, most of the attacks
are drive-by download attacks. Such attacks commonly
rely on sophisticated exploit techniques to bypass the existing defense mechanisms, and malicious web pages often go through heavy transformations in the browser, which
bring significant challenge to the traditional dependencybased analysis techniques. Thus we believe PointerScope’s
result on such attack will demonstrate the potential of our
technique. The vulnerabilities and exploits are summarized
as follows.
• CVE-2010-0249: Microsoft IE HTML Object Memory Corruption. Windows platform.
• CVE-2009-3672: Microsoft IE “Style” Object Remote
Code Execution. Windows platform.
• CVE-2009-0075: Microsoft IE Document Object Handling Memory Corruption. Windows platform.
• CVE-2006-1016: Microsoft IE Javascript IsComponentInstalled Overflow. Windows platform.

CVE
CVE-2010-0249
CVE-2009-3672
CVE-2009-0075
CVE-2006-0295
CVE-2006-1016
CVE-2006-4777
CVE-2006-1359
CVE-2010-3333
CVE-2010-3962

Attack Technique
Uninitialized memory; heap spray
Incorrect variable initialization; heap-spray
Uninitialized memory; heap spray
Heap overflow; heap spray
Stack overflow; SEH exploit
Integer overflow; heap spray
Incorrect variable initialization; heap spray
Stack overflow vulnerability; SEH exploit
Incorrect variable initialization; heap spray

Runtime
18m23s, 8m30s
3m10s, 31s
25m, 21m16s
3m5s, 1s
4m59s, 1m33s
1m45s, 40s
11m58s, 13s
18m53s, 7m24s
10m36, 15s

Conflicts
11
2
6
3
3
3
2
1
2

Trace Size
307,987,560
22,759,299
411,323,083
808,392
64,355,691
2,632,241
8,336,193
236,331,307
9,281,019

Slice Size
48,404,242
955,325
44,792,770
34,883
1,334,253
1,669,751
29,520
814,305
78,704

Table 2. Summary of evaluation. The “Runtime” shows two pieces: the first is the time spent on
generating the execution trace and the second is the time spent on generating the key-step graph
from the trace. The “Conflict” lists the number of pointer misuses detected. “Trace size” is the total
number of instructions in the execution trace. “Slice size” is the number of instructions in the slice
that the exploit is dependent on.

• CVE-2006-0295: Firefox location.QueryInterface
code execution. Linux platform.
• CVE-2006-4777:
Microsoft IE Daxctle.OCX
KeyFrame Method Overflow. Windows platform.
• CVE-2006-1359: Microsoft IE createTextRange Code
Execution. Windows platform.
• CVE-2010-3333: Microsoft Word RTF pFragments
Stack Buffer Overflow. Windows platform.
• CVE-2010-3962: Microsoft IE CSS SetUserClip
Memory Corruption. Windows platform.

5.1

Summary of effectiveness and performance

The result of our evaluation is summarized in Table 2.
The execution traces’ sizes range from about 30K instructions to 411M instructions. Accordingly, it took PointerScope from 1.26 second to about 27 minutes to diagnose
the exploits. In each diagnosis, a significant portion (more
than 60%) of time was spent on generating the trace.
PointerScope detected all control hijacking behaviors
through pointer misuse detection, and correctly characterized the attacks’ key steps. We will analyze the details of
selected exploits later in this section.
In addition, we collected the following statistics on how
PointerScope can improve the efficiency of attack analysis
by comparing with dynamic program slicing technique [5]
and dynamic taint analysis [25]. Starting from the instruction i that transfers control into malicious payload, we use
program slicing on the execution trace to extract all the instructions that influence the instruction i via direct and indirect data dependency. The number of instructions in this
slice is listed in the column “Slice Size”. As a reference,

we also list the total number of instructions in the execution trace for each exploit sample. We can see that although
dynamic program slicing can generally extract a small slice
relative to the total trace size, the sheer size of a slice is
still huge (from tens of thousands to several million instructions).
As for dynamic taint analysis, we mark the exploit input
as tainted and track the tainted input propagating through
data dependency. Then an alarm is triggered whenever the
instruction pointer becomes tainted. We investigated two
taint propagation policies: P1: direct data dependency
only; and P2: indirect data dependency included. We made
the following observations. On one hand, for all of these
exploits except CVE-2006-0295, no alarm is raised if only
direct data dependency is tracked. This is because these
exploit inputs propagate through indirect data flows. On
the other hand, tracking indirect data dependency induced
too many alarms, ranging from about 1K to 759K. This
phenomenon coincides with Slowinska and Herbert’s finding [32]. Therefore we can see that dynamic taint analysis
becomes less effective for detecting and analyzing these sophisticated memory-corruption attacks. In contrast, PointerScope detected a small number of pointer misuses, which
pinpoint the key attack steps.

5.2

Case studies

We use several representative samples to describe the detailed analysis results for them.
5.2.1

Microsoft IE Javascript IsComponentInstalled
overflow

This attack is similar to the attack described in Section 2.
It exploits a stack overflow vulnerability to overwrite the

M@0x13c7e1[1]
Type Usage (CTR)

M@0x13c7e2[1]
Type Usage (CTR)

Type Usage (CTR)

M@0x13c7e0[1]

Type Origin (NTR) Type Origin (NTR)
temporal

M@0x13de19[1]

Type Origin (NTR)

Type Usage (CTR)

temporal

[14651944] 0x77f8339e call %ecx
R@ecx[4] M@0x0013c430[4]
0x3337a@ntdll.dll@ExecuteHandler2@20

temporal

Type Usage (CTR)

M@0x13de1b[1]

Type Origin (NTR)

Type Usage (CTR) Type Usage (CTR)

M@0x13de1a[1]

Type Origin (NTR)

[14651947] 0x71ab8e4c ret
M@0x0013c438[4]
0x8e2d@ws2_32.dll@DPROVIDER::~DPROVIDER

M@0x13c438[4]

Type Origin (DTR)

[14651911] 0x77f617dd pushl 0x4(%ebx)
M@0x0013de18[4] M@0x0013c48c[4]
0x11763@ntdll.dll@_RtlDispatchException@8

temporal

[14651654] 0x761001c0 retn $0x18
I@0x00000000[2] M@0x0013c7e0[4]
0x10016@urlmon.dll@IsActiveSetupFeatureLocallyInstalled

Type Usage (CTR)

M@0x13c7e3[1]

Type Origin (NTR)

Figure 5. Key-step graph for IE Javascript IsComponentInstalled overflow.

Type Origin (NTR)

[1013039] 0x77e79bc5 mov (%eax,%ebx),%al
M@0x7ﬀb028f[1] R@al[1]
0x19b63@kernel32.dll@_GetMBNoDefault@24

Type Usage (CTR)

M@0x13de18[1]

Type Origin (NTR)

stack, including the return address and the exception registration record. The overwritten return address triggers an
exception. When preparing to call the exception handler,
Windows pushes the exception registration record’s address
r on the stack as one of the arguments to exception handler. This is a key step that enables the attack to navigate
to the injected code. Finally, the overwritten exception handler leads to a ret instruction that uses the address r, and
activates the injected code.
The attack graph is shown in Figure 5. It includes
three conflicts, where two variables of data type are used
as control pointers and a data pointer is used as control
pointer. From the graph, we can see that the conflictcausing variable, the return address, is pushed onto the
stack as a data pointer in the exception handling function RtlDispatchExcpetion. Moreover, the ret instruction was reached by a call instruction from the function ExecuteHandler2 in the library ntdll.dll, which
causes a pointer misuse when using data as control pointers. This variable used by the call is the overwritten exception handler pointer on the stack. Therefore, with help
of PointerScope, we correctly capture the key steps for this
SEH-based attack.
Once the key steps of the attack are identified, we employ
data dependency analysis on each step to help us understand
the attack mechanism. The first pointer misuse is on the instruction retn $0x18, it is the return instruction in function IsActiveSetupFeatureLocallyInstalled. But
by following data dependency, we can see that the return
address is combined by the bytes which have been copied
by a mov instruction, not from a call instruction. This
is the typical scenario of stack overflow. For the second pointer misuse is on the instruction call %ecx from
function ExecuteHandler2. This call instruction, similar with retn $0x18, use a variable combined by bytes
copied by instruction mov (%eax,%ebx),%al. And if we
check the assembly code of function ExecuteHandler2,
we know the call target is an exception handler. So this
pointer misuse is caused by overwritten exception handler. Another interesting fact is that both pointer misuses
are caused by a single overflow. The last pointer misuse is on a simple return instruction. Its return address
is 0x0013de14. There was a pushl 0x4(%ebx) from
function RtlDispatchException, which pushed a variable at 0x0013de18 onto the top of stack. So we know
0x0013de18 is a data pointer. Since %ebx + 0x4 is data
pointer, it is easy to understand that %ebx + 0x0, whose
value is 0x0013de14, is also data pointer. This is misuse
from data pointer to control pointer. By checking the assembly code and definition of function ExecuteHandler2, we
understand that the variable pushed onto stack is the parameter EstablisherFrame for exception handler.

Putting every piece together, we get a complete story of the attack, which employed a
buffer overflow to overwrite the return address of
IsActiveSetupFeatureLocallyInstalled and the
SEH structure on the bottom of the stack. It used a invalid
value to trigger an exception and hijacked control flow
by the overwritten exception handler. Finally, it located
shellcode by parameter EstablisherFrame, which is
prepared by function ExecuteHandler2.
We can also look for root cause of the exploit.
The vertex retn $0x18 in function
IsActiveSetupFeatureLocallyInstalled is the
conflict where the corrupted return address is used. The
pointer misuse is caused by using a few data bytes as a
pointer. After locating instructions that write into these
bytes in the trace, we found a big loop that starts to
write at the address 0x0013c4ed. This is at the beginning
of the overflowed buffer. It is at the offset 755 of the
function’s stack frame. Since the corrupted return address
is highlighted, we identified the vulnerable function
IsActiveSetupFeatureLocallyInstalled.
Such
information helps developers to quickly identify and fix the
problem.
5.2.2

Microsoft IE “Style” object remote code execution

This attack is caused by a vulnerability in the class
CDispNode’s member function SetExpandedClipRect.
It uses an index value from the HTML page to compute an
offset o from an array a, and find a flag variable located
at o bytes before the instance of CDispNode. It then sets
the second bit of the flag (or $0x2, %eax). However, the
array a’s first entry is incorrectly initialized as zero, which
makes the offset o zero when the index value is zero. Therefore, the address of the CDispNode instance is taken as the
address of the flag. Now the flag is actually the pointer to
the instance’s virtual function table. When the function ORs
the flag with 0x2, the pointer to the virtual function table is
incremented by 2. As a result, the pointer to the first virtual
function is taken from an address off by 2, which happen to
be an address pointing to the heap. A call to the first virtual
function will execute code attackers prepared on the heap.
As Figure 6 illustrates, there are two pointer misuses.
The instruction at the bottom is the step where the control
transfers to attacker’s code. This is an interesting case in
which both the operand content and operand address have
conflicts. Following the operand content conflict, we found
this instruction used parts of two other pointers as the target for call. This is clearly wrong. To find the reason,
we followed the conflict in the operand address, where we
found the address (data pointer) is from the output of an or
instruction (integer).

[16934872] 0x749120f2 call *0x2c(%eax)
M@0x74831544[4] M@0x0013e068[4]
0x102098@mshtml.dll@CLayout::SizeDispNode
temporal

Type Origin (CTR)

[16937930] 0x74943a14 call *0x30(%eax)
M@0x74831548[4] M@0x0013dde4[4]
0x13393f@mshtml.dll@CDispNode::GetNodeClipTransform
Type Origin (CTR)

M@0x74831544[4]

temporal

[16940456] 0x74a291f2 or
$0x2,%eax
I@0x00000000[1] R@eax[4]
0x2191d4@mshtml.dll@CDispNode::SetExpandedClipRect

M@0x74831548[4]

Type Origin (NTR)
Type Usage (CTR) Type Usage (CTR)

R@eax[4]

temporal

Type Usage (PTR)
[16940584] 0x7490e854 call *0x2c(%eax)
M@0x74831546[4] M@0x0013e0d4[4]
0xfe838@mshtml.dll@CLayout::GetFirstContentDispNode

Figure 6. Key-step graph for Microsoft IE “Style” Object Remote code execution vulnerability.
After the key steps of the attack are identified, we use
data dependency analysis and slicing on each step to help
us understand the attack mechanism. This call instruction
contains two misuses. The first one is on the call target.
From data dependency of call target we know that this target actually is combined by two parts. Each of those two
parts came from a variable who is used to be call target.
Then let us look at the address of the highlighted call target. It is computed like %eax + 0x2c. This is a typical
style of virtual function call and %eax is supposed to be
the base of virtual function table. And it is easy to find
out from data dependency that the three eax that are used
by non-highlighted instruction call *0x2c(%eax), call
*0x30(%eax) and or $0x2,%eax is the same variable.
But this variable is change by instruction or $0x2,%eax
in Figure 6, which is not supposed to happen.
After we understand the malicious control transfer is
triggered by the or instruction, we performed backward
slicing on its operands, and found the root cause of this
exploit nine instructions away. It is an instruction at the
address 0x74a291da, which uses the incorrectly initialized
first entry of a. Therefore, PointerScope significantly reduces the amount of analysis needed in identifying the root
cause of this exploit.

5.2.3

Microsoft IE object tag buffer overflow

This attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in handling the MIME type of the Object HTML tag. The vulnerable code converts each “/” character in the MIME type
string into the sequence “ / ” after checking the destination
buffer size using the size of the original MIME type. Thus,
a MIME type with lots of “/” characters will overflow the
destination buffer and overwrite the return address.
PointerScope identified that the injected code started to
execute after a ret instruction, whose return address is created by a push instruction that pushes the esp register on
the stack. The push instruction was preceded by another
instruction causing pointer misuse. It is the ret instruction
that uses the overflowed return address. The above three instructions are executed in a sequence. Thus, this attack puts
its shell code right after the overflowed return address, and
“returns” to an instruction sequence push %esp; ret. By
understanding these key steps, we understand that this is another mechanism that redirects the execution into the shell
code on the stack when the stack location cannot be predicted.

Program
AcroRd32.exe
calc.exe
cmd.exe
firefox.exe
(www.google.com)
iexplore.exe
(about:blank)
iexplore.exe
(www.google.com)
msmsg.exe
mspaint.exe
notepad.exe
Skype.exe
winword.exe

False Positive
3
0
0
3

Trace Size
328,429,372
51,573,864
120,69,909
277,982,830

1

119,996,863

2

317,299,855

0
0
0
5
5

64,033,207
80,211,147
66,073,327
205,427,083
194,218,192

Table 3. Summary of false positive evaluation.
The “False Positive” lists the number of distinct false positive. “Trace size” is the total
number of instructions in the execution trace.

5.3

False Positive Analysis

Benign program execution may also trigger pointer misuses for performance optimization or other reasons. Since
we aim for offline security analysis, having a small number
of false positives is not a big concern. Furthermore, we can
use a white-list to filter out the known false positives from
the final diagnosis report.
We conducted experiments for false positive evaluation
using a collection of Windows utilities, such as Notepad,
Internet Explorer, etc. We used those utilities to perform
their typical operations, such as surfing common web portals and edit documents. We took traces of these operations
and analyzed the conflicts. The result is shown in Table 3.
We summarized the common patterns causing conflicts into
the special cases used in our type operation described in
Section 4 and Appendix.
We encountered some interesting false positives in our
experiment. These false positives cannot be handled by
PointerScope’s type operation algorithm.
The first false positive comes from the function
sbh alloc block from page in mshtml.dll.
mov
mov
mov
lea
add
sub
imul
lea
shl
sub

0 x8(%ebp ) ,% e c x
(% e c x ) ,% e d i
%e d i , 0 x8(%ebp )
0 x f 8 (% e c x ) ,% e s i
%edx ,(% e c x )
%edx , 0 x4(% e c x )
$0xf ,% ecx ,% e c x
0 x8(% e d i ) ,% eax
$0x4 ,% eax
%ecx ,% eax

Suppose %ecx is p1 and %edi is p2. The above instructions actually compute (p2 + 8)*16 - p1*15, which is
p1 + (p2 - p1 + 8)*16. According to the instructions
before this code segment, the ecx contains a memory address that is aligned to page boundaries, which should be a
pointer to an empty page. And p2 is the first member of a
structure at the beginning of the empty page. So the effect
of this computation is to generate a pointer pointing to another structured data in the page, as indicated by p1 + (p2
- p1 + 8)*16. However, the original computation (p2 +
8)*16 - p1*15 seems meaningless. We believe this is the
result of compiler optimization.
The tracing on Microsoft Word shows a complex encoding and decoding process. From the report, we can derive that it first encodes an internal variables using a series
of bit operations byte by byte, and then decodes it when
using those variables later. Here is a piece of code from
winword.exe trace file.
mov
mov
and
and
xor
xor
shr
and
shr
xor
sar

(% e d i ) ,% c l
0 x27(% e s p ) ,% ebx
$ 0 x f f ,% e c x
$ 0 x f f ,% ebx
%ebx ,% e c x
$0x100 ,% e c x
$0x1 ,% e c x
$ 0 x f f ,% eax
$0x1 ,% eax
%eax ,% e c x
$0x1 ,% e c x

In this code slice, variables are treated as raw data.
We cannot restore the original type information inside this
structure due to the complex encoding and decoding operation. So we have to filter this kinds of false positives by
white-listing.
For Skype, most of false positives come from one
special case when it takes a fixed value directly as a pointer,
which is calculated from an immediate through a fixed
series of operations. Actually, the call instruction is using
an immediate as target address. Our data type scope will
recognize this scenario as a conflict of using INT as PTR.
We need handle this through a special pattern to recognize
using fixed value as a pointer by tracking operations on
immediate. Here is a code slice from Skype.

mov 0 x 2 9 d e 0 2 7 f ,% eax
r o r 0 x10 , %eax
add 0 x47a7bc4 ,% eax
neg %eax
add 0 x75a1292 ,% eax
c a l l %eax
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Limitations and Future Work

In this section, we discuss the limitations of our current
implementation and future work.
Integer overflows The current type system of PointerScope cannot be used to diagnose integer overflow attacks,
which is caused by the confusion between signed and unsigned integers. We may extend the type system to distinguish signed and unsigned integers. However, this extend
type system may introduce lots of innocent type conflicts
that appear frequently in normal program execution. For
instance, conflicts between signed and unsigned integers
can be commonplace in normal programs. Nevertheless, it
would still be an interesting research problem how to eliminate innocent type conflicts in an extended type system. We
plan to investigate this problem in the follow-up work.
Self-modifying Code We noticed that for some normal
program executions, PointerScope falsely detected several
type conflicts. These conflicts came from self-modifying
code. A variable is firstly used as a data pointer to write
into a code region, and then used as a control pointer to
jump into the code region. It causes a type conflict between DTR and CTR. This is not an uncommon case, especially in Windows. To allow self-generating code, we can
use a learning-based approach to identify the normal codegeneration locations, and use a white-list of these locations
to avoid reporting these innocent type conflicts.
Dependency among key steps PointerScope identifies
the key steps, but does not analyze the dependencies among
the steps. PointerScope may also miss key steps that do not
incur type conflict. As the next step, we propose to combine
PointerScope with dependency-based analysis, such as taint
analysis, to perform more complete diagnosis to memorycorruption attacks.
Although the key-step graph highlights important steps
of an exploit, manual efforts are still needed to analyze the
exploit comprehensively. In the follow-up work, we will
also investigate in automated solutions that can further reduce manual efforts.
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Related Work

Attack Diagnosis Techniques. Some existing diagnosis
techniques [12, 18, 20, 25, 28, 38, 40] automatically analyze
the attack and illustrate how this attack has happened.
BackTracker [18] builds up a dependency graph between
OS objects, such as processes, files, sockets, and so on, and
this dependency graph can be used to trace back the origin
of an intrusion. In comparison, exploit diagnosis needs to

reason about dependency between instructions, so a dependency graph in the OS object level is too coarse grained.
Dynamic taint analysis [25] keeps track of the data dependency originated from untrusted user input at instruction
level, and detects an exploit on a dangerous use of a tainted
input. Then a data dependency graph can be constructed
from the detection point. However, as a study shows, when
tracking indirect data dependency is blindly enabled, the
amount of tainted data and dependency information will explode, generating tremendous amount of false alarms and irrelevant dependency relationships. Moreover, taint analysis
may miss important attack steps because these steps depend
on the tainted input via control flow. DTA++ [17] enhances
traditional taint analysis by handling a targeted subset of
control flow. Based on dependency analysis, Argos [28]
detects zero-day attacks and generates network-level signatures to prevent future attacks, while Vigilante [12] generates host-level filters. PointerScope and taint analysis have
complementary advantages: PointerScope highlights important instructions among a huge amount of dependencies,
while taint analysis focuses on such instructions to generate
detailed diagnosis.
Several solutions [19, 20, 38, 40] perform dependency
analysis to analyze a piece of malware and extract valuable insights about its attack mechanism. In particular,
Panorama [40] and HookFinder [38] also generate dependency graphs to facilitate security analysts.
Two exploit diagnosis systems take memory analysis approach [22, 37]. When an exploit attack is detected, these
tools capture the memory snapshot on this moment, and
then try to find evidence on this memory snapshot to reason
about the root cause of this attack. It is infeasible for this
static analysis approach to understand the entire process of
an exploit attack.

Defense and evasion techniques in memory-error exploits. There are a wide-range of solutions to detect and
prevent software exploits. Techniques, such as controlflow integrity (CFI) [4], data-flow integrity (DFI) [10], and
WIT [6] proactively defeat exploits by enforcing program
integrity models, which are derived through extensive analysis of program and often need program source code. In
contrast, PointerScope aims to diagnose exploits by inferring types from binary execution, which can complement
the above solutions when they are not applicable. Defense
mechanisms like StackGuard [36], PointGuard [13], ASLR
(i.e., address space layout randomization) [3, 9], and DEP
(i.e., data execution prevention) [2] are implemented and
deployed in software and the operating system to defeat
software exploits. They break some of the key steps of an
exploit, while the goal of PointerScope is to get the complete picture of exploits for diagnosis.

The attackers always invent new evasion techniques to
bypass these defense mechanisms. For instance, to bypass DEP, a returned oriented malicious payload reuses
the existing code in vulnerable program and runtime libraries [31]. More specifically, small code snippets ending with a return instruction are stitched together to implement Turing-complete malicious functionalities. More recently, researchers showed that return-to-libc attacks can be
accomplished without using return instructions [11]. Moreover, bypassing both DEP and ASLR is possible, as a study
shows [16]. Recent news about enhanced Aurora exploit
confirms this statement [7].
As this arms race continues to escalate, the objective of
our work is to automatically capture the characteristics of
a new exploit and understand the weakness of the existing
defense system, so that the defense system can be enhanced
promptly to thwart similar exploit techniques.
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Conclusion

In this paper, we presented the design and implementation of an exploit diagnosis tool, called PointerScope. The
goal was to analyze sophisticated software exploits, which
pose substantial challenges to the existing analysis techniques because of the complexity of web browsers and extensions and sophistication of exploits. To tackle this challenging problem, we leveraged a key insight that the key
steps of these memory corruption attacks are often pointer
misuses. To catch these pointer misuses, we designed a
small type system on x86 instructions and devised a type
inference algorithm to resolve type information during the
binary execution and detect type conflicts. Then we performed dependency analysis on these type conflicts to understand the inner-working of an exploit. We evaluated multiple recent sophisticated memory-corruption exploits, and
demonstrated the capability and effectiveness of of PointerScope.
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A

Special usage of instructions

In this section, we summarize the special usage of instructions
we identified and encountered during evaluation.

A.1

Special use of bit instructions

Special usage of and
• zero test: and is used to test whether a variable is zero or
not.

Special usage of shl/shr
shl is considered a multiply operation, shr is considered a
divide operation. Those two instructions are originally for bit operations, but they are widely used for multiplication and division.
For example, mostly the memcpy function takes a source
pointer, destination pointer and a byte counter as parameters. The
compiler can put the two pointers into esi and edi and the byte
counter into ecx, then run movsb directly. But for higher efficiency, compiler always uses a two-bit right shift operation to the
counter before putting it into ecx and uses rep movsd instead
of rep movsb. Similarly, shl will be used when the compiler
tries to convert a double-word counter into byte counter.
Special usage setc
setc is used to store a bit of CPU’s EFLAG. This is be a
boolean variable, but it may be used as an index (INT) sometimes.

and %eax, %eax
• mask usage: and can be used to align memory address by
masking out lower bits.
• abnormal usage: We observed two unusual scenarios used by
and.
and 0xfffffffb, %eax
and 0x03, %eax
In the first scenario, assuming that the eax register is of type
PTR, we should keep it as the PTR type after and operation.
In the second scenario, no matter what type the register eax
is, it will be changed to the type INT.
• assignment:
and 0x0, %eax
In above example, and is used to set the value of eax. So
we create a rule that if the result of the and is equal to one
of the source variables, the result will inherit the type of that
source variable.
Special usage of or
• zero test: or can be used to do zero test.
or $0x0, %eax
• mask usage: or is used to mark a pointer, used by Firefox.
or $0x01, %ecx
• assignment:
or $0xffffffff, %eax
Similer with and, if the result of the or is equal to one of
the source variables, the result will inherit the type of that
source variable.
Special usage of xor
• zero set: It can be used to set a variable to zero.
xor %eax, %eax
• encode data: Sometimes xor is used to encode/decode data
with an integer key.
xor $KEY, %ebx ...

xor $KEY, %ebx

A.2

Pointer tag in Firefox

or 0x01, %ecx
and $0xfffffffc, %ecx
mov %eax, 0x24(%ecx)
From our analysis on Firefox, it shows Firefox has a special
mechanism on pointers. In Firefox, it uses jsval as a pointer.
Each jsval value encodes the type of data it points to. For example, if lower three bits of a jsval value is 0x2, then this jsval
pointer points to DOUBLE, 0x4 for STRING, and etc. Adding
or removing tags from a data pointer is very common operations
in Firefox. Tags are added by the and instruction and removed
by the or instruction. xor is also used to remove a tag from a
pointer. We treat them as special cases.

Instruction
Category
Data transfer
Control transfer
Binary arithmetic
Decimal arithmetic
Logical
Shift and rotate
Bit and byte
String

IO
Flag control
Segment register
Misc

Representative
Instructions
MOV, CMOV, PUSH, POP
JMP, JZ, LOOP, CALL, RET
ADD, SUB
IMUL, MUL, IDIV, DIV
DAA, AAA
AND, OR
SAR, SHR, SAL, ROL, RCL
BT, BTS, SETS
MOVS, LODS, STOS
CMPS, SCAS
REP, REPZ, REPNZ
IN, OUT, INS, OUT
LAHF, SAHF, PUSHF, POPF
STC, CLC, CMC, STI, CLI
LDS, LES, LFS, LGS, LSS
MOVBE
LEA
NOP, UD2

Type Constraints
Type constraint between operands
Operands are control pointer
Type constraint between operands
Operands are integer
Operands are integer
Type constraint between operands
Operands are integer
Operands are integer
Type constraint between operands
None
Type constraint between operands. ECX is integer
None
Operands are integer
None
None
Operands are integer
Type constraint between operands
None

Table 4. Type constraints of common instructions.

